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Abstract 
 
In recent years it has become accepted wisdom that children subject to youth justice 
intervention, in England and Wales, are more complex than previously, as a consequence of a 
substantial rise in diversion from the system that filters out children with lower levels of need 
and less entrenched offending. This ‘complexity’ thesis has been used to explain rises in rates 
of reoffending. This article demonstrates that the patterns shown in the reoffending data are 
not those that would be predicted by the complexity thesis. Indeed the data suggests that 
some groups of children may be less entrenched in offending than hitherto.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Since 2010, reducing reoffending has been one of the formal measures of youth justice 
performance, and arguably, from a political perspective, the key indicator of the effectiveness 
of youth justice intervention. Yet the reoffending target has, to date, received little academic 
attention. As a consequence, trend data which appear to show that children’s recidivism was 
falling consistently up to 2008 but has, in the intervening period, shown an opposite 
trajectory, have been subject to little critical scrutiny. This is in spite of their considerable 
potential to influence youth justice policy and practice. This article aims to go some way to 
filling that gap.  
 
At the same time, rising reoffending rates for children have frequently been explained in 
terms of what we refer to as the ‘complexity thesis’: the suggestion that children who enter 
the youth justice system have higher levels of needs and are more entrenched in patterns of 
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offending than hitherto. As a consequence, the risk of reoffending for this group is said to be 
higher than it was a decade ago. Analysis of the reoffending data does not, however, support 
such a suggestion in any straightforward manner. We argue that the thesis is accordingly 
inadequate as an explanation of recent trends. This is not to dispute that the youth justice 
population may be more complex on a variety of measures than hitherto. It is simply to 
maintain that such changes, if they have occurred, do not explain recent shifts in rates of 
reoffending as they are sometimes assumed to do. 
 
We begin by critically reviewing the recent history, and value, of the use of reoffending rates, 
as a measure of effectiveness, before engaging in an exposition of recent reoffending data, 
their relationship to the complexity thesis, and a preliminary exploration of how they might 
be best understood.  
 
The focus on reoffending 
 
Trends for detected youth crime, as is well known, cannot be taken as unproblematic 
indicators of the extent of children’s lawbreaking since they are equally manifestations of 
shifts in youth justice policy and practice (Bateman, 2015). For instance, diversionary 
strategies implemented by successive governments in England and Wales, in the recent 
period, have led to a rapid contraction of that system. The Youth Crime Action Plan (YCAP), 
published in 2008 (Home Office, 2008), committed the government to achieving a reduction 
in the number of children entering the youth justice system for the first time – so called first 
time entrants (FTEs) - and this target has been a prominent feature of youth justice policy for 
all subsequent governments. The measure has had a dramatic impact on the size of the youth 
justice cohort: between 2008 and 2018, the number of total proven offences committed by 
children has declined by 75%, largely accounted for by a fall in FTEs (Youth Justice Board/ 
Ministry of Justice, 2019). 
 
These developments contrast dramatically with those in the period immediately prior to the 
FTE target. Between 2003 and 2007, there was as sharp expansion in the number of children 
subject to formal youth justice disposals, a trend also explicable in terms of government 
policy. A target to increase the number of ‘offences brought to justice’ introduced in the 
earlier year (commonly referred to as the sanction detection target) led to an increase of 22% 
in the number of children entering the criminal justice system by 2007. This was a 
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consequence of net-widening, a process whereby children were criminalised for behaviour 
that would not previously have received a formal sanction (Bateman, 2017).  
 
There have accordingly been sizeable fluctuations in the level of proven youth crime over the 
past 15 years, but these are thus best understood primarily as an artefact of changing political 
priorities rather than an indication of changes in children’s offending behaviour. Such an 
understanding has significant implications for the focus of the current article since similar 
considerations apply to data on reoffending, which also rely on offending that is detected and 
receives a formal sanction.  
 
For reasons outlined in due course, reoffending has for some years been regarded by the 
government as one of the primary measures of the effectiveness of the youth justice system.1 
In that context, it is instructive to reflect on how interpretations of evidence relating to that 
indicator can be influenced by political expediency. It is, perhaps, not surprising that when 
data suggested that there had been a reduction in one year recidivism rates, following a youth 
justice disposal, of 7.3 percentage points between the first quarter of 2000 and the equivalent 
period in 2008 (Ministry of Justice, 2010), the government was quick to claim that this 
demonstrated that ‘[their] approach to youth crime was working’ (Department for Children, 
Schools and Families, 2010: 1). In fact, the trend was more convincingly explained as a 
predictable outcome of net-widening, itself triggered by the drive to increase the number of 
formal sanctions imposed, so that children whose behaviour would not previously have been 
thought to warrant a formal youth justice response were increasingly criminalised.  As a 
consequence, the profile of those within the system in 2008 had changed considerably since 
the baseline year of 2000, with the former characterised by a substantially higher 
representation of girls, younger children and those processed for minor misdemeanours. The 
comparison, on the basis of which claims of effectiveness were made, was thus unreliable 
since the latter cohort was demonstrably less likely to offend. Empirical analysis, published at 
the time, confirmed that the reduction in recorded reoffending was largely accounted for by 
children who, but for the sanction detection target, would not have received a formal disposal 
(Bateman, 2010).   
 
                                                     
1 While we use the term reoffending rate, we acknowledge that this refers only to detected reoffending since 
about half of offences are reported and around a quarter of these that are detected (Bateman, 2006).  
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In line with other commentators, the government subsequently appears to have accepted the 
logic of this argument. Rates of reoffending following contact with the youth justice system 
have tended to climb since 2008, but this rise is frequently explained in terms of the shifting 
profile of children captured by the data, rather than as indicative of a deterioration in the 
performance of the youth justice system. For instance, the incumbent Chair of the Youth 
Justice Board has referred to a ‘smaller, more challenging cohort of children who offend’ 
who are ‘the most difficult to rehabilitate’ (Taylor, 2016: 2-7). More generally, the 
government has attributed rising recidivism to a cohort with ‘an increasing propensity to 
offend’ (Ministry of Justice, 2017: 8).  
In this sense, the dominant explanation of the escalation in rates of reoffending has relied on 
a discourse based on what we term the complexity thesis; the suggestion that the contraction 
in the youth justice population has been accompanied by what Alun Michael has referred to 
as ‘a thickening of the soup…    a residue of much more difﬁcult cases from difﬁcult 
backgrounds, much more embedded perhaps in a culture of offending’ (cited in House of 
Commons Justice Committee, 2014: 94). The complexity thesis might thus defined as the 
view, largely accepted by the Youth Justice Board, that  
 
‘the young people who are left in the system now are the most challenging to work 
with. This was due to, among other reasons, more complex family backgrounds, more 
mental health issues, more group or gang offending and more serious youth violence’ 
(Youth Justice Board, 2015: 15). 
 
This shift is understood primarily to be a consequence of the diversion from the system of 
large numbers of children involved in low-level offending (Carlile, 2014; Taylor, 2016; 
Bateman, 2017). At the same time, the cohort of children who continue to attract formal 
sanctions are also widely said by youth justice professionals to have greater needs than 
previously (Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Probation, 2017; Wigzell, forthcoming; Carlile, 
2014; Gray, 2013). A recent stocktake of youth offending teams, for instance, noted that 
services ‘reported an increasing complexity of need in the young people dealt with’ (Deloitte, 
2015: 4).  
 
In the abstract, Ministry of Justice data appear to be broadly consistent with such an 
explanatory account: the reoffending rate in the year ending March 2016 was 5.2 percentage 
points ⁠ higher than in 2008; over the same period, the average number of re-offences per child 
 5 
also increased from 3.13 to 3.83 (Youth Justice Board / Ministry of Justice, 2018). On closer 
inspection, however, the picture is less straightforward than these headline figures suggest. In 
particular, reoffending by children subject to community sentences has fallen steadily since 
2008. In the light of such evidence, this article accordingly questions whether recidivism data 
do in fact provide evidential support for the suggestions that the youth justice cohort has 
become more complex and ‘criminogenic’ in the manner that is widely assumed. (This is not 
to deny that there may be other such forms of evidence.) 
 
The challenge to the complexity thesis developed here is, thus, a partial one. It relates to its 
deployment as an explanation of recent trends in recidivism rather than to the thesis itself. 
The paper does not explore whether claims that the current youth justice cohort has greater 
needs than previously have empirical support. The issue of whether ‘increased complexity is 
a genuine phenomenon or a symptom of YOTs’ assessment tools becoming more 
sophisticated’ is not addressed in any detail (Deloitte, 2015: 4).  
 
National data that would allow examination of this question are not collected in a consistent 
fashion and the available empirical evidence is accordingly limited. Nonetheless, a number of 
commentators, as noted above, have reported a wide consensus amongst youth justice 
professionals of this trend (Deloitte, 2015: Youth Justice Board, 2015; Wigzell, forthcoming). 
Moreover, there is some evidential support so far as children in the secure estate are 
concerned: surveys of children in young offender institutions and secure training centres 
suggest that the current custodial population displays higher levels of need than their 
contemporaries in previous periods (Green, 2019). Given the rise in diversionary practice 
over the past decade, there is, moreover, a clear logic for considering that the needs profile of 
children in the youth justice system is likely to have changed. The complexity thesis, as a 
description of shifts in the youth justice population, may be true, but this is an issue for 
further research and lies beyond the scope of the current paper.  
 
For present purposes, the argument is thus narrowly construed. It contests discourses that 
purport to explain recidivism as a function of complexity; conversely, it also questions 
accounts that cite rises in reoffending as evidential support for the more complex nature of 
the youth justice population (see for instance, Bateman and Hazel, 2014). 
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The argument developed is that, if the predominant explanation of the earlier reduction in 
reoffending demonstrated an unwarranted assumption that recidivism was a direct 
manifestation of the effectiveness of system intervention, more recent accounts of the 
subsequent rise in reoffending fail to acknowledge the different nuances shown in the data. 
The changing characteristics of the youth justice population prove to be just one strand in a 
broader fabric of contributory factors.  
 
 
 
Reoffending: a questionable measure of performance 
 
With the advent of what has become known as the ‘new youth justice’ (Goldson, 2000: ix), reoffending 
rates have increasingly been considered as the key litmus test of youth justice success (Bateman, 2010; 
for similar trends in probation, see Canton, 2012). Although comprising just one of the three youth  
‘performance indicators’ introduced by the Coalition government in 2010, a glance at government 
pronouncements on youth justice confirms that reoffending continues to be the primary concern (see, for 
example, Gove, 2015).2 A growing preoccupation with recidivism was formalised by section 37 of the 
Crime and Disorder Act 1998, which established that the principal aim of the youth justice system was 
to ‘prevent offending by children and young persons’. To eliminate potential confusion, the section was 
subsequently amended by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 to confirm that the reference 
to offending included reoffending (Bateman, 2010). The roots of this fixation can no doubt be found in 
late modernity, characterised by the politicisation of crime, an enthusiasm for managerialism that 
emerged in the late 1970s (Canton, 2012; for a discussion of such changes see also Farrow et al, 2007; 
and Garland, 2002), and an increasingly risk averse stance to the provision of public services, 
manifested in the development of a youth justice assessment framework that purported to measure the 
risk of reoffending (Kemshall, 2008). 
 
This focus on reducing children’s delinquent behaviour is not in itself obviously irrational. Certainly, it is 
hard to imagine that anyone would promote an increase in offending. In this sense, one would naturally 
expect youth justice practitioners to be concerned with – among other things - supporting the children 
with whom they work to move, over the longer-term at least, towards a non-offending lifestyle.  (For a 
                                                     
2 The three performance indicators are reducing: first time entrants to the youth justice system; the use of 
custody; and reoffending (Youth Justice Board, 2017). 
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discussion of the assumption that the point of the criminal justice system is to reduce crime see Canton, 
2012). But such considerations do not imply endorsement of the current focus on proven reconviction. 
The existing measure has been widely criticised as a flawed indicator of effectiveness, a blunt gauge of 
progress towards ‘desistance’, as well as being overly narrow and deficit-focused (Criminal Justice 
Alliance, 2011; Bateman, 2010; 2016a).  
 
We have already noted that the relationship between detected reconviction and effectiveness is, at best, 
indirect and that treating recidivism as a proxy for youth justice performance is problematic. It is also 
frequently conceded – including by the government itself – that the binary (‘yes’/ ‘no’) rate of 
reoffending is an extremely blunt measure of the trajectory of an individual’s criminal behaviour as it 
does not capture changes in the frequency or nature of their offending (Bateman, 2016b; Criminal 
Justice Alliance, 2011; Home Office, 2004; Ministry of Justice, 2008). A twelve month follow-up period 
is unhelpfully short-term and incompatible with longer-term developmental processes associated with 
the transition from childhood to maturity. These factors are significant because desistance is a 
protracted process, characterised by ‘a pendulum of ambivalence’ (Burnett, 2004: 169; see 
also McNeill, 2006) and drifting in and out offending (Matza, 1964). Thus, a 16-year-old boy 
who had committed several robberies over a short period, subsequently not offended for six months and 
then engaged in minor shoplifting, might reasonably be considered to be showing signs of growing out 
of crime (Rutherford, 1992; Bateman, 2014). Yet, under the binary measure, they would be recorded a 
‘failure’. 
 
Reoffending rates are essentially deficit-focused, negative, measures insofar as they foreground the 
absence of an activity from an individual’s life rather than taking account of achievements, They are 
rooted in what has become known as the ‘risk factor prevention paradigm’ which has, at least until 
recently, tended to dominate youth justice policy and practice on the basis of constructing the child as a 
repository for risks that need to be corrected (Case, 2018). There is little scope in this model for 
recognising the widespread and transitory nature of youthful offending behaviour which, in the large 
majority of cases, is left behind as children make the transition to adulthood (McVie, 2005). It fails to 
acknowledge the importance of agency in the journey towards a non-offending lifestyle that is enhanced 
by a future orientation and a focus on the child’s strengths, desires and ambitions since it ties them to 
their past transgressions (Haines and Case, 2015). In this sense, a focus on reoffending is in tension with 
the Youth Justice Board’s (2019) recent conversion to a vision based on ‘child first’ principles. It 
measures children’s progress on the basis that they have not broken the law rather than in terms of any 
other, arguably more meaningful, achievements they have made and diverts policy makers’ and 
 8 
practitioners’ attention away from issues to do with wellbeing and longer term development towards an 
emphasis on short term metrics (National Association for Youth Justice, 2018). Finally, it presupposes 
that a single episode of law breaking, however minor, is indicative of a failure to engage in desistance, in 
spite of the overwhelming evidence that the latter is sometimes a lengthy process, that may be 
‘punctuated by occasional failures and relapses into crime, even after progress has been made’ (Her 
Majesty’s Inspectorate of Probation, 2016, 31).   
 
Thus, returning to our imagined 16-year-old, there may have also been significant improvements in 
school attendance, mental well-being and engagement with the youth offending service, providing 
further indication of a movement away from crime. Yet the favoured measure of effectiveness does not 
take account of such progress. In contrast, at a local level, there is some evidence that youth justice 
practitioners conceptualise success primarily in terms of  ‘small steps’, such as improved well-being and 
better supervisory relationships, with cessation in reoffending considered as a rather remote aim that will 
ensue over the longer term (Wigzell, forthcoming; see also Johns et al, 2017).  
 
In this respect, it is noteworthy that this emphasis on reoffending is a relatively recent phenomenon. 
Prior to the 1998 reforms, work with children in trouble was largely undertaken by social 
workers as part of children’s social care, in line with the duty to uphold the welfare of 
children in need, in accordance with the Children Act 1989 (Audit Commission, 1996). 
Historically, youth justice practitioners have tended to focus on promoting the longer-term healthy 
development of children with whom they work, rather than concentrating on whether they can avoid the 
imposition of a formal disposal over a twelve month period, on the assumption that the former would 
encourage the natural process of desistance in any event Haines and Drakeford, 1998; for a more recent 
endorsement of such an approach, see National Association for Youth Justice, 2018). 
 
Canton (2012) has argued compellingly that the ethics and effectiveness of probation have been stymied 
by an explicit concern with reducing reoffending, enforcement and public protection and that work with 
adult offenders would be better served by a human rights-based, personal approach premised on the 
principle of obliquity (the idea that goals are often best achieved indirectly). This argument is equally 
relevant to youth justice.  
 
Methodology  
 
 9 
The argument developed in this paper relies heavily on national official statistics for children’s one year 
reoffending between 2008 and 2016, published by the Ministry of Justice. This period was selected 
because the FTE target was introduced in the former year, triggering a rapid contraction in the youth 
justice population and an associated rise of a discourse that relies on the complexity thesis. Figures for 
2016 were the latest available at the time of writing. We also draw on trend data for the number of 
children cautioned or convicted, published by the Youth Justice Board / Ministry of Justice, and data on 
the custodial population, over the same period. To allow consistent comparison a cutoff date of 2016 has 
been adopted for this latter data as well, even though more recent figures are available.3 The analysis 
involves detailed interrogation of these various datasets, with elements of integration and disaggregation 
of, and comparison between, figures from each of the sources, in order to present an original and more 
nuanced account of the statistical information than that suggested by the headline data that may be 
derived from each.  
 
The primary focus of the analysis is to explore how recidivism trends for different disposal types might 
be best understood and the extent to which the complexity thesis has explanatory power in this regard.  
 
The approach inevitably has a number of limitations. In particular, data for youth offending, and 
reoffending, record incidents that are detected and receive a formal criminal justice sanction. They are 
accordingly susceptible to changes in policy and practice. This limitation is however mitigated in part by 
an explicit recognition of this potential in the analysis. Perhaps more importantly, published statistics are 
not always disaggregated in ways that allow analysis which would better illuminate some of the issues 
discussed.  Attention is drawn to such deficiencies in the data at relevant points in the argument.  
 
As noted previously, the issue of whether or not there is other evidence, not captured in the reoffending 
data, that the needs of children in the youth justice system have become more pronounced is not 
addressed. The discussion of complexity is accordingly a relatively narrow one that deliberately focuses 
on its deployment to explain trends in reoffending and, conversely, whether recidivism data in and of 
themselves suggest that the youth justice cohort as whole has a greater propensity to offend. 
 
Recent youth justice reoffending trends 
 
                                                     
3 Reoffending data require a follow up period which, in the case of custodial sentences, cannot commence until 
the point of release. As a consequence, publication of figures for recidivism inevitably lag behind those for 
children subject to caution or conviction. 
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The caveats in relation to the utility of recidivism as a measure of performance 
notwithstanding, there is nonetheless merit in exploring what recent reconviction statistics 
might reveal about developments in youth justice. As suggested above, closer analysis of the 
data casts doubts over claims that trends shown therein provide evidential support for an all-
encompassing trend towards a cohort that is more entrenched in its offending and more 
difficult to rehabilitate.  
 
Reference has already been made to the fact there was a 5.2 percentage point increase in the 
rate of children’s reoffending between 2008 and 2016. However, as shown in table 1, this 
tendency has been driven largely by a rise associated with pre-court disposals: the proportion 
of children proved to have reoffended within twelve months of receiving a caution4 rose by 
5.4 percentage points, from 25.4% to 30.8% between 2008 and 2016. Over the same period, 
by contrast, the equivalent figures for first tier penalties5 and custodial sentences all declined, 
by 4.5 and 7.2 percentage points respectively (Youth Justice Board/ Ministry of Justice, 2018: 
table 9.7).  
 
Table 1  
Proven reoffending of children by selected index disposal  
2008 and 2016 
 
Disposal Proportion of children reoffending  Percentage point 
change: 2008-16 
 2008 2016  
Caution 25.4% 30.8% 5.4 
First tier 
penalty 
47.8% 43.3% -4.5 
Custodial 
sentence 
75.3% 68.1% -7.2 
 
 
The position in relation to community sentences is less straightforward: the youth 
rehabilitation order (YRO) was introduced by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 
2008, with effect from November 2009, replacing a range of existing community orders, of 
                                                     
4 The Legal Aid Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 replaced the existing pre-court system of 
reprimands and final warnings with youth cautions from 8 April 2013. For ease of exposition, the term caution 
here, and elsewhere in the article, includes those earlier disposals.    
5 First-tier penalties comprise discharges, fines, the reparation order and the referral order. 
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which the supervision order was by far the most widely used (Nacro, 2010). Directly 
comparable figures over the full reference timeframe for orders classified as community 
sentences are not therefore available. However, on the reasonable assumption that the YRO is 
functionally equivalent to the range of disposals it replaced, there has also been a reduction in 
reoffending for such sentences of 3.2 percentage points.  
 
These contrasting trends are clearly not compatible with a single explanation drawing on the 
notion that the youth justice population has become more challenging, which would lead one 
to anticipate increases in recidivism across the range of disposals. At the same time, it would 
be perverse, given the discussion to date, to suppose that improvements in the effectiveness 
of youth justice interventions could account for the falls in reoffending for court orders. This 
is particularly so given the abundant evidence that conditions for, and treatment of, children 
in the custodial estate have deteriorated sharply (see for instance, HM Inspector of Prisons, 
2018; Bateman, 2016b; Joint Committee on Human Rights, 2019) and stringent criticism of 
resettlement practice (Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Probation, 2015). More generally, there 
has been a significant reduction in resources available to youth offending teams which have 
fallen by more than a quarter in the past five years (Youth Justice Board/ Ministry of Justice, 
2019). While statutory caseloads have of course also declined, mitigating to some extent the 
impact of constrained budgets, capital expenditure on premises and administration tends to be 
constant so that diminished resources are disproportionately experienced in terms of staffing 
levels and services to children where the savings can be more readily made. More pertinently 
perhaps, as the number of children subject to formal disposals lessened, most services have 
shifted focus to incorporate considerable preventive work as a ‘core business’, offsetting the 
potential benefits, in terms of resources, of increased diversion (Youth Justice Board, 2015: 
16. See also, Deloitte, 2015). Related to this, there is some evidence that YOT practitioners 
perceive their workloads to be largely unchanged due to a greater concentration of children 
with complex needs on their caseloads, a proliferation in associated ‘paperwork’ and cuts to 
local welfare services, resulting in pressure on YOTs to bridge the divide (Wigzell, 
forthcoming). 
 
Making sense of the data: cautions and incarceration 
 
If the standard narrative, in the form of the complexity thesis, does not fully account for the 
patterns shown in the statistics, it does not follow that it should be rejected as having no 
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explanatory power. In fact there are grounds to suppose that a changing profile of children in 
receipt of pre-court disposals might indeed have impacted on levels of reoffending for that 
group.  
 
One might anticipate that the FTE target would have a disproportionate impact on the number 
of children given a caution since those committing relatively low level offences, and those 
with no previous record of criminality, would be more likely candidates for informal 
diversionary measures. The same process, by removing from the pre-court part of the system 
a cohort of children least likely to reoffend, would thereby be expected to raise the recidivism 
rate for that group. This assumption is supported by the trend data for different disposal 
types. As shown in figure 1, the decline in the number of children cautioned, over the relevant 
period, was considerably more pronounced than that associated with convictions. (The fall in 
relation to the latter was similar for cases resulting in both custodial and non-custodial 
outcomes.) The potential for a change in the characteristics of the pre-court cohort – and 
scope for the complexity thesis to apply to that population – is accordingly greater. In other 
words, the larger decline in the number of children given cautions, by comparison with other 
disposals, is likely to have been a consequence of a filtering out of children with lower level 
of needs, leaving behind a more complex group with a higher likelihood of reoffending which 
is then reflected, as the complexity thesis predicts, in increased recidivism for this group. 
 
Figure 1  
Percentage fall in different disposal types: 2008-2016 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Cautions Non custodial
sentences
Custodial sentences All convictions
 
 
 13 
But the decline in the number of convictions – though smaller – has also been substantial. 
Some account is therefore still required of why corresponding falls in the population of 
children in receipt of a court order have not also resulted in rising recidivism for that group, 
albeit that one would expect the trend to be more muted than that displayed by the pre-court 
court cohort.  
 
The fall in proven reoffending following a custodial disposal might be considered particularly 
surprising given that it is generally acknowledged, as noted above, that conditions in the 
children’s secure estate have deteriorated markedly in recent years and a range of 
commentaries that point to a more challenging population in the secure estate (Wood et al, 
2017; Green, 2019; HM Inspector of Prisons, 2018; Bateman, 2016b; Hazel and Lockwood, 
2016), with an escalation in already excessive levels of violence, self-harm, the use of 
restraint and isolation from peers. In the light of such evidence, any suggestion that 
improvements in the effectiveness of custodial provision might have contributed to lower 
rates of recidivism would appear to lack credibility. 
 
A rather different account has been proposed that proceeds from the well attested tendency 
for the large majority of children to grow out of crime as they mature (McAra, 2018). 
Bateman (2017) has pointed out that the fall in the custodial population has occasioned a rise 
in the average age of children who are detained and increases in the length of incarceration. 
In combination, these factors entail that release occurs, on average, at a later age - closer to 
the point at which the natural process of desistance would be expected to commence – than 
previously.  
 
There is statistical support that lends plausibility to the account. Between 2008 and 2016, the 
number of children in custody below the age of 15 years fell by almost 80%; the equivalent 
figure for 16-17-years-olds was considerably lower at around 65%. Recidivism data are not 
disaggregated by age and disposal type, but, as shown in table 2, the overall rise in 
reoffending since 2008 has been substantially faster for the younger age group, who are both 
underrepresented in custody and overrepresented in the population of children receiving a 
caution. A similar pattern is evident for the frequency of reconviction: for the youngest age 
group, the average number of re-offences per child rose from 2.92 to 4.03 between 2008 and 
2016, compared to a jump from 3.11 to 3.71 for 15-17-year-olds (Youth Justice Board / 
Ministry of Justice, 2018).   
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Table 2  
Proven reoffending of children by age group:  
2008 and 2016 
 
Age range Proportion of children reoffending  Percentage point 
change: 2008-16 
 2008 2016  
10-14 years 33.5% 43.0% 9.5 
15-17 years 38.9% 42.0% 3.1 
 
Over the same period, the average duration of custodial episode rose from 76 to 90 days 
(Youth Justice Board / Ministry of Justice, 2013; 2018) and recorded reoffending rates 
decline in line with sentence length, as indicated in table 3. 
   
Table 3  
Proven reoffending for custodial sentences by sentence length: 2016  
 
Length of custodial sentence  Proportion of children 
reoffending  
Less than or equal to 6 months 73.5% 
More than 6 months to less than 12 months 71.4% 
12 months to less than 4 years 62.0% 
 
The trend towards a reducing rate of reoffending for children leaving custody is not the 
pattern that would be predicted by the complexity thesis. There are however good grounds for 
supposing that the data can be readily explained as a function of the age-crime curve.  
 
Making sense of the data: non-custodial sentencing  
 
 15 
The complexity thesis would lead one to anticipate an increase in reoffending rates for 
children subject to community-based court orders, but, as we have seen, the statistical 
evidence appears to show a contrary trend. So far as we aware, there have been no previous 
attempts to explain this apparent paradox. The analysis offered here is accordingly 
exploratory and, of necessity, limited by the incomplete nature of the published data. It is 
however possible to consider three factors that might feature in any satisfactory account.  
 
Age  
The first of these concerns age. If, as argued previously, an increase in the average age of 
children in the custodial population might help to account for the fall in the reoffending for 
that group, it might be thought relevant that the age profile of children who receive pre-court 
disposals is also younger than for those who are convicted. In 2016, for instance, just over a 
third of children given a caution were below the age of 15 years, compared with 21% of those 
in receipt of a court order (Ministry of Justice, 2018). On the other hand, as shown in figure 
2, the representation of younger children in the pre-court cohort has fallen more rapidly than 
in the latter. The fact that the average age of children in receipt of non-custodial sentences has 
risen very slightly would not therefore appear to contribute to an understanding of why 
reoffending trends for this group should have diverged from those for pre-court sanctions.  
 
Figure 2  
Children aged 10-14 who received a caution or conviction as a percentage of all children 
in those groups: 2008-2016 
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Offence type 
If shifts in age shed little light on the problem, analysis of index offences might offer some 
suggestive insights. As the number of children in the youth justice system has contracted, the 
profile of offences occasioning a formal sanction has altered.  Moreover, the nature and 
extent of the shift has differed in important respects for cautions and community sentences. 
At the same time, reconviction rates naturally vary according to the index offence and these 
too change over time.  
 
As a consequence, if the shift in the profile of offences leading to community sentences 
involved relative increases in those crimes with a declining, or stable, rate of conviction, 
while the profile of cautions showed an opposite trajectory, these changes would provide a 
partial account of patterns shown in the reconviction data. Moreover, if serious offending had 
risen more sharply among the pre-court population, and such matters were associated with 
higher levels of reoffending, then the complexity thesis might after all play a legitimate 
explanatory role.  
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In the event, the evidence in this regard proves to be somewhat mixed.  
 
Table 4 shows index offence type by changes in reconviction rates between 2008 and 2016, 
grouped according to the direction of change over that period. Offences associated with a 
decline in recidivism are shown at the top of the table; those manifesting a rise, appear in the 
lower rows. Data is also provided for each index offence as a proportion of all offences 
leading to caution or community sentence, indicating the direction and extent of change of 
that proportion over the same period (data drawn from Ministry of Justice, 2018 and Youth 
Justice Board / Ministry of Justice, 2018). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4  
Index offence type by rate of reconviction and proportion of total offences leading to 
caution or community sentence, with changes over time (percentage points):  
2008 – 2016 6 7 
 
Index 
offence 
Reconviction rate  As a proportion of all 
offences leading to 
caution 
As a proportion of all 
offences leading to a 
community sentence 
 2008 2016 PP 
change 
2008 2016 PP 
change 
2008 2016 PP 
change 
Sexual 
offences 
18.8%  15.2% -3.6 0.5% 1.8% 1.3 0.7% 2.1% 1.4 
Robbery 
 
49.3% 46.0% -3.3 0.3% 0.4% 0.1 4.2% 4.4% 0.3 
Possess 
Weapon 
37.7% 36.3% -1.4 2.6% 7.3% 4.7 4.0% 8.0% 4.1 
Violence  
 
31.6% 31.0% -0.6 7.2% 7.5% 0.4 5.9% 5.8% -0.1 
          
                                                     
6 Criminal damage includes offences  of arson. 
7 Figures may always sum due to rounding. 
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Criminal 
Damage 
37.9% 39.0% 1.1 3.4% 2.3% -1.1 3.3% 1.5% -1.8 
Drugs 
offences 
38.7% 40.0% 1.4 8.6% 13.9% 5.3 5.8% 7.6% 1.9 
 
Public order 
 
48.4% 51.2% 2.7 1.1% 1.8% 0.7 1.8% 3.3% 1.5 
Miscellaneous 
 
46.7% 49.7% 3.0 2.0% 2.4% 0.4 4.6% 4.2% -0.4 
Fraud 
 
25.7% 29.4% 3.7 0.7% 0.6% -0.1 0.3% 0.6% 0.3 
Summary -  
non motoring 
37.7% 43.2% 5.5 40.7% 42.0% 1.4 40.1% 41.8% 1.6 
Theft 
 
34.5% 47.1% 12.6 32.9% 20.0% -12.9 25.9% 17.6% -8.3 
          
Summary 
motoring 
37.7 37.0 -0.7 N/A N/A  3.4 3.0 0.4 
 
 
It should be acknowledged that there are considerable limitations to the data. The offence 
categories each capture a broad array of behaviours and take no account of the nature or 
extent of previous offending. A degree of caution should therefore be exercised in treating 
them as straightforward indicators of the seriousness of offending. It is also unclear what 
kinds of incidents are included in summary non-motoring offences; this is particularly 
problematic given that such matters account for more than 40% of cautions and community 
sentences.8 Finally the dataset for cautions does not have a distinct category for summary 
motoring offences. Figures for community sentences in relation to these offences are for this 
reason presented separately in the table. 
 
These limitations notwithstanding, it is possible to make a number of potentially useful 
observations. First, as might be anticipated given that overall recidivism has grown over the 
relevant period, the recorded reconviction rate has risen for most offence types, but not all. In 
contrast to what might be predicted by the complexity thesis, offences which show reductions 
in reoffending are, for the most part, those which might be considered among the most 
serious: including violence, robbery and sexual offending. It is not at all obvious why this 
might be, but a possible explanation is offered in due course.  
 
At the other end of the scale, by far the biggest rise in reconvictions rates – a percentage point 
increase of 12.6 - is associated with theft, followed by that for summary non-motoring 
                                                     
8 It seems likely that at least some of the offences included in the summary non-motoring category would fit 
better in other categories. 
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offences. Most of the incidents falling within these two categories are unlikely to be matters 
of the utmost gravity. These two offences types, in combination account for around six in 
every ten matters leading to caution or community sentence. It would thus appear that the rise 
in reoffending has been driven largely by changes in reconviction for offending towards the 
lower end of the scales of seriousness; a pattern which is not obviously consistent with 
expectations that might be derived from the complexity thesis.  
 
As noted above, the profile of incidents leading to a formal youth justice sanction has 
changed considerably as the number of children receiving such sanctions has declined. As 
shown in table 4, the most dramatic shift has been a reduction in the proportion of sanctions 
imposed for offences of theft. While this trend is consistent with the suggestion that less 
serious offences have been progressively filtered out of the system, the fall has been 
substantially lower for community sentences than for cautions (a percentage point decline of 
8.3 for the former as against 12.9 for the latter). Again this pattern is not obviously supportive 
of the complexity thesis since one might anticipate that lower level offences would 
increasingly attract a pre-court sanction rather than a conviction if there had been a consistent 
process of down tariffing. It is, in this context, perhaps telling that in 2016, almost 60% of 
community sentences were imposed for matters of theft or summary non-motor offences.  
 
There have, it is true, been proportionate rises in some of what might be considered more 
serious offences within the two cohorts, such as sexual offending, robbery and weapons 
possession. For the first two of these, the relative increase has been greater for community 
sentences than for cautions. Yet the overall extent of change is small and the differences 
between the two cohorts is modest. Sexual offences rose as a proportion of all episodes 
leading to a caution by just 1.3 percentage points compared to 1.4 percentage points for 
community sentences; the equivalent figures for robbery were 0.1 and 0.3 percentage points 
respectively. Conversely, the relative increase in sanctions imposed for possession of 
offensive weapons was larger for cautions than for community sentences; and while there 
was a small proportionate rise in cautioning for violence against the person, such offences 
actually fell – albeit very slightly - as a proportion of convictions (by 0.1). None of these 
figures supports the view that the offending of children subject to community supervision is 
becoming substantially more serious. 
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The primary difference between cautions and community sentences, in terms of changes in 
offence profile, relates to theft. Such offences account for the largest proportionate decline in 
both cohorts, but the fall is considerably sharper for the group receiving cautions. To the 
extent that this indicates that the youth justice population is characterised by more serious 
offending, it would seem that this development has impacted the cautioning cohort to a far 
greater degree than children receiving a community sentence. The complexity thesis would 
again appear to require modification and qualification.        
 
As highlighted above, theft also manifests by far the largest change – in the form of a sharp 
rise - in rates of reconviction. This poses something of a conundrum: the fall in the 
prevalence of theft offences leading to a community sentence might, taken in isolation, help 
to account for the decline in reconviction rates for those orders; but the logic of this position 
would also predict a larger decline in recidivism for cautions given that there has been a more 
rapid reduction in the proportion of pre-court disposals imposed for theft. As we have seen, 
the data for cautions shows precisely the opposite pattern. Whatever the explanation for this 
apparent paradox, it is clear that the complexity thesis does not, on the face of it, offer an 
adequate account.      
 
Previous offending history 
As noted above, data bated on offence type is limited in certain respects. Moreover, it 
illuminates just one aspect of changes in youth justice cohort. A further element, of at least 
equal significance, is the extent of lawbreaking prior to receiving the disposal against which 
reconviction is measured. Some caveats are again in order since statistics for previous history, 
just as those for reconviction, are generated from offending leading to a formal sanction 
rather than offending behaviour itself (Bateman, 2015). This is particularly relevant in the 
current context since the complexity thesis relies in part on the, reasonable, assumption that a 
significant proportion of detected offending which in an earlier period would have attracted a 
formal response has, since 2008, been dealt with informally (Bateman, 2017). As we have 
seen, however, the anticipated rise in reconvictions, which such an assumption would predict, 
is not borne out by reoffending data for community sentences. Analysis of available statistics 
in relation to the antecedent history of children at different stages of the youth justice system 
helps to throw further light on this puzzle. 
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The first point to note is a positive correlation between the extent of previous offending and 
recidivism; as shown in table 5, children with eleven or more previous offences recorded 
against them have a reconviction rate more than three times that of children with no 
antecedent criminal record (Youth Justice Board/ Ministry of Justice, 2018).    
 
Table 5  
Proven reoffending by number of previous offences: 2016  
 
Previous offences  Percentage of cohort reoffending 
None 24.7% 
1 to 2 previous offences 42.3% 
3 to 6 previous offences 56.8% 
7 to 10 previous offences 64.9% 
11 or more previous offences 76.0% 
 
It is possible to discern in the data some support for the complexity thesis up to a certain 
point: between 2008 and 2016, there has been a rise in the rate of reoffending for children 
with no previous offending from 20.8% to 24.7%. There has been a comparable growth in the 
rate of reconviction for children with one or two previous offences from 38.7% to 42.3%. For 
children with higher levels of previous convictions, recidivism rates have, conversely, fallen. 
Such a pattern might be thought consistent with an assumption that those with a limited 
record of offending have benefited from the FTE target, and have, as a consequence, tended 
to enter the formal system at a later stage of delinquency than their peers who, in an earlier 
period, had already acquired a record of previous formal sanctions.  
 
The impact of the target on the youth justice population as a whole can be viewed through 
different lenses. On the one hand the absolute number of FTEs in the system has fallen 
sharply, by almost 82% between 2008 and 2016. But considered in relation to the overall 
decline in youth justice throughput, the reduction appears to be more modest; sanctions 
against FTEs as a proportion of all disposals imposed has reduced from 46% to 43%. The fall 
in non-FTEs has in other words been more pronounced.  
 
Significantly, this latter reduction is, moreover, not evident across all types of youth justice 
outcome. Some disposals have been characterised by a rise in the proportion of sanctions 
imposed on FTEs. This is not surprising, in itself, since potential FTEs cannot be diverted 
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from the system indefinitely and, if they continue to come to police attention, will be at 
increasing risk of formal processing. One might anticipate that this would be particularly 
reflected in cautioning since this is the first option available for such children. However 
figures show that, between 2008 and 2016, the proportion of FTEs among the pre-court 
disposal cohort has fallen slightly. Perhaps more unexpected is that there has been a 
substantial increase in the proportion of FTEs receiving community sentences, albeit from a 
lower baseline.  
 
As shown in figure 3, while the proportion of cautions imposed on FTEs declined by two 
percentage points, there was an increase for community sentences of sixteen percentage 
points, almost tripling FTE representation in the community sentence cohort from 9% to 
25%. Given that FTEs have a much lower likelihood of reoffending than other children, these 
shifts go some way to account for different trends in reconviction rates for these two disposal 
types.  
 
It would appear that one of the (unintended) consequences of the FTE target is that a larger 
proportion of children with no criminal record are ‘skipping’ the caution stage and being 
propelled straight to more intensive forms of sentencing. Contrary to the complexity thesis, 
the community sentence cohort appears to have become less entrenched in offending than in 
the period prior to 2008. Surprisingly, perhaps, the principal reason that rates of reoffending 
have declined for children subject to a community sentence while those for children subject 
to cautions has risen, is that the former group embodies a lower risk of reoffending because it 
includes a considerably higher proportion of FTEs than hitherto. While such evidence does 
not, in itself, undermine the complexity theory it does raise questions as to whether, and to 
what extent, children subject to formal intervention are, in fact, ‘much more embedded … in a 
culture of offending’ (Alun Michael, cited in House of Commons Justice Committee, 2014: 
94). 
 
Figure 3 
First time entrants as a proportion of children receiving cautions and community 
sentences: 2008 and 2016 
 
 23 
 
 
 
At this point, it is worth revisiting an issue raised earlier pertaining to a decline in 
reconviction rates for some of the more serious offence types. One possibility is that certain 
types of high profile behaviours – such as sexual offending and weapons possession - have, 
to some extent, bypassed the diversionary impulse that has led to other, lower level, offences 
being kept away from the formal justice system unless the child offended repeatedly. In that 
event, a considerable proportion of children engaging in more serious forms of behaviour 
might be fast-tracked into the court system, by-passing pre-court options, and attract a 
community sentence even though they have no previous offences recorded against them. This 
group of children would have a corresponding lower risk of recidivism. Unfortunately the 
data cannot be disaggregated in a manner that would allow analysis to confirm the 
hypothesis, but it is a consideration that may warrant further research.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This article has sought to question the value of reconviction as an unproblematic measure of 
the performance of the youth justice system. It has also attempted to challenge a standard 
narrative that has emerged to explain recent rises in children’s recidivism which understands 
such rises as an expected outcome of increased complexity. The assumption that increased 
revidivism is a function of the youth justice cohort having become more challenging and 
entrenched in its behaviour as a consequence of rising diversion, may capture a partial truth. 
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In particular, there is reason to support that it might offer a useful explanatory framework for 
understanding at least some of the rise in reoffending associated with cautioning. However, it 
cannot account for the simultaneous decline in the level of reoffending manifested in other 
parts of the system.  
 
In particular, the thesis is mistaken in implying that children subject to a community sentence 
tend to commit more serious offences and are more entrenched in their offending than 
hitherto. Indeed, the falling reoffending rates for that group over the last eight years appear to 
best understood as a manifestation of a substantial rise in the proportion of this cohort who 
are FTEs. Contrary to claims that the current youth justice cohort is likely to be more 
‘criminogenic’ and harder to rehabilitate, the evidence adduced here appears to show that a 
substantial, and increasing, proportion of children subject to court orders have, in fact, a very 
limited offending history and as a consequence tend to show lower rates of reoffending.  
 
The analysis presented is restricted by limitations of the published data which do not allow 
disaggregation by reconviction rate, age, offence type and criminal history. Such data would 
be required to test fully some of the explanations offered here. It is nonetheless clear from the 
available evidence that policy makers might do well to abandon the existing pre-occupation 
with reconviction as  a measure of ‘effectiveness’ since the variables that combine to deliver 
that single figure are too complicated to provide a meaningful indicator of success.  
 
In many ways, this is unsurprising for reasons that go beyond statistical anomaly. Focusing 
on such a target overlooks the fact that, for many children subject to youth justice 
intervention, simply engaging in the supervision process is an achievement, the outcome of 
which may only be discernible years later as they move towards desistance. Reconviction 
data, while undoubtedly useful for some purposes, neglect the element of practice that 
practitioners and children often regard as most meaningful. As Souhami (2007: 66) notes in 
her ethnographic study of a youth offending team, workers felt that ‘meaningful 
[quantitative] measurement of their work was impossible’ because the latter was primarily 
concerned with the nurturing of interpersonal relationships. As suggested earlier in this paper, 
such an assessment may be overly pessimistic: it is possible to develop alternative, more 
eloquent, ways of weighing the impact of youth justice practice that better capture what really 
matters to children, practitioners and wider society. But insofar as Souhami’s critique is 
directed at reoffending it is well made. The arguments presented here provide additional 
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grounds for thinking that further refinement of outcome measures is warranted. Canton’s 
(2012) call for supervision that is premised on the principle of obliquity provides a powerful 
rationale for such an undertaking.  
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